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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  The aim of this paper is to shed light on the sub-national level of income inequality by analysing 
its determinants and possible effects on regional economic performance. Although income inequality is 
one of the most frequently examined issue in social sciences, a shortage of data has largely inhibited a 
promising shift to a territorial level below the country dimension, so far limited to American states or 
regions of single EU countries. The recent availability of data supplied by the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) and the results produced by researches based on their use, have greatly contributed towards filling 
this informative gap, also with reference to Europe. 
The paper is organised as follows. After the introductory section, the first part (section 2) poses 
the conceptual bases of the study, considering the most important theoretical and empirical arguments on 
the determinants of income inequality, the relationship between inequality and growth, and the 
specificities of the regional (intended as sub-national) level of analysis, focusing in particular on the 
effects of factor mobility. The empirical part of the paper (section 3) first presents the databases employed 
and then some descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes and discusses the econometric approaches 
adopted (4.1), the theoretical expectations and the results obtained by modelling the determinants of 
regional inequality (4.2), and the evidence about the relationship between regional inequality and growth 
(4.3). Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
Our findings show that most determinants of inequality within European regions lie in qualitative 
and quantitative features of regional labour markets and in national-level institutional settings. As regards 
the effects of inequality on growth, although it was not possible to carry out econometric tests with 
advanced techniques emphasised by recent literature as crucial for reliable results, our outcomes suggest 
that a positive relationship may exist. 
 
2. INCOME INEQUALITY DETERMINANTS, INEQUALITY-GROWTH NEXUS, AND THE REGIONAL LEVEL OF 
ANALYSIS 
The empirical and theoretical literature regarding inequality of income distribution is ample and 
articulated (Slottie and Raj, 1998) and a substantial part of it contains contributions aimed at identifying 
its determinants and at evaluating its possible impacts on economic growth. Section 2.1 briefly reviews the 
factors most often considered in explaining income inequality within economic systems; more in-depth 
discussion of this literature is provided when the empirical model is presented (§ 4.2.1). Section 2.2, 
without any claim to be exhaustive, discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth. Section 2.3 discusses the specificities of regional levels 
of analysis. 
 
2.1 Structural, Socio-Demographic and Institutional Determinants 
The factors affecting income distribution include social, institutional and economic forces, which have 
been examined in a very extensive theoretical and empirical literature. They may be classified into a few 
groups. The first one regards the general economic and structural features of the economic systems, and 
obviously includes the stream of literature initiated by Kuznets (1955), which establishes a quadratic 
relationship between the stage of economic development and income inequality. With respect to the initial 
formulations, this approach has evolved in various directions, focusing on the roles of specific factors 
connected with structural and technological change. A very rich literature has concentrated in particular on 
the effects of qualitative evolutions of labour demand towards higher skill intensity (SBTC - skill biased 
technical change hypothesis) on inequality (e.g., Berman et al., 1994; Acemoglu, 1998), and on its 
interactions with some features of labour supply, i.e., human capital. The impacts of these evolutions may 
be accelerated by growing trade integration (Barro, 2000; Li et al., 1998; Richardson, 1995) which 
normally boosts the adoption of new technologies and the demand for skilled labour (Kim, 1997; Wood, 
1995). The distributive consequences of these processes clearly depend on the countries’ positions in the 
international division of labour (e.g., Barro, 2000; Robbins, 1996; Dollar and Kray, 2004). 
Besides skills endowment and distribution, other characteristics of labour supply are usually 
considered. They include the consequences of demographic features - average age and structure of the 
population (e.g., Panizza, 2002; Partridge et al., 1996), and more in general the factors which most affect 
relative wage levels and dynamics. The literature has focused in particular on the pressures on unskilled 
wages and the risks of structural unemployment generated by high participation rates of specific segments   3
of the labour force (Topel, 1994), and by migration flows (e.g., Barro, 2000; Mauro, 1995; Borjas et al., 
1992; Borjas and Ramey, 1994). 
Another important group of factors associated with inequality patterns refers explicitly to institutional 
aspects, primarily related to labour market regulations (e.g., Blau and Khan, 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 
1997; Koeniger et al., 2004), but also to the structure and size of the fiscal and social security systems 
(e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Castles and Mitchell, 1992; Holsch and Kraus, 
2002). Other aspects, specific to developing economies, are the degree of democratisation (existence of 
civil liberties, electoral rights, rule of law) and the accessibility of education systems, which in turn 
depends on the existence and efficiency of credit markets, and which may constrain the conservative 
pressures of the rich minority and thus the imposition of anti-distributive policies (e.g., Barro, 2000; Li et 
al., 1998, Bénabou, 1996a). 
  The extensive literature about the determinants of income inequality, also due to the variety of its 
theoretical and empirical perspectives, cannot always provide conclusive evidence on the relationships 
existing between the various factors considered and inequality. The complexity of these links is also 
augmented by the interactions existing between the possible determinants. The building of a 
comprehensive theoretical model of regional inequality determinants is clearly beyond the aim of this 
paper, which is instead addressed to a first theoretical and empirical exploration of possible linkages 
happening at sub-national levels. This attempt is clearly constrained by data availability, which allows 
shedding light only on a limited set of aspects: we discuss their specific theoretical background and 
propose consequent testable hypothesis when presenting the empirical specification (§ 4.2.1). 
 
2.2 Inequality and Economic Growth: Conflicting Theories and Empirical Evidence 
The direction of causality of the inequality/growth relationship is uncertain and debated; the works of 
Bertola (2000), and Aghion et al. (1999) are examples of contributions discussing the effects of growth on 
inequality. In view of the aims of this paper and of the data available for empirical analysis, we focus here 
on the possible effects of initial income inequality levels on subsequent growth. 
The theoretical and empirical literature does not provide univocal evidence of an existing clear and 
stable relationship between inequality and growth, and may be divided into two main classes, which 
predict a negative and a positive link, alternatively. 
The first view was prevalent in the early 1990s and predicted and supported empirically - using mainly 
cross-sectional data - a negative relationship (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Bertola, 1993; Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Garcia-Penalosa, 1995; Perotti, 1996). The motivations 
adduced for this relationship may be summarised into three main streams of argument related to (i) 
political economy / institutional mechanisms, (ii) human capital endowments, and (iii) the effects of social 
and political dissatisfaction. The political economy argument was first put forward by Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) in a two-stage model in which economic inequality creates political pressures, via the 
election of governments with redistributive priorities or growing social conflicts, to alter tax or transfer 
systems and this reverberates on growth (see also, among many others; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Perotti, 
1996; Bénabou, 1996a; Tanninen, 1999; Barro, 2000). The net effects on growth depend on the structure 
of government intervention and social transfers, and on the strength of the distortion that taxation 
introduces on economic decisions and incentives. These aspects are considered in an institutional 
perspective by North (1994), who emphasised how the institutional setting shapes the set of economic 
incentives and the consequent existence of different kinds of organisations (see section 2.3). 
The second main channel of negative influence on growth relates to the consequences of inequality 
levels of human capital endowment, distribution and access. In more unequal societies, relatively worse-
off individuals miss the opportunity to engage in costly investments (especially in human capital), giving 
up productivity improvements, individual higher returns and curbing aggregate growth rates. The 
possibility of undertaking such investments may be hampered by the existence of credit constraints (Li et 
al., 1998), credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993), and poorly developed financial markets 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). 
A third way in which inequality negatively affects growth refers to the social dissatisfaction it 
generates (e.g., Bénabou, 1996a; Perotti, 1996; Barro, 2000), which produces adverse effects on growth 
via (a) direct or indirect waste of resources and (b), more importantly, via the discouraging effects on 
investments that threats to property rights exert. 
A second group of contributions, consistent with remarkable theoretical antecedents (Kaldor, 1957; 
Okun, 1975; Arrow, 1979; Stiglitz, 1969), has challenged the conjecture of inequality as being harmful for   4
growth firstly on empirical grounds, contending that the evidence provided using cross-sectional 
approaches was to be considered unsatisfactory. This was essentially motivated by the poor robustness to 
any sort of sensitivity analysis of outcomes obtained in cross-sectional studies, due to two main problems 
(Forbes, 2000): (i) measurement errors in inequality, due to poor quality data, and (ii) omitted-variable 
bias, essentially due to the existence of country specific effects distorting ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates. The two problems were simultaneously addressed with a new dataset by Deninger and Squire 
(1996), who assembled a much larger, more reliable, consistent and comprehensive dataset, and provided 
several measures of inequality over time for each country. This panel structure allowed the omitted 
variable bias to be limited to the unobservable country-specific features which evolve over time. 
These aspects were acknowledged by a number of authors who used various panel econometric 
approaches to extract the relationship. With the important exceptions of Panizza (2002) for a panel of 
American states and Sukiassyian (2007) for some European and former Soviet transition economies, these 
studies provided evidence of a positive (Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000; Frank, 2008) or mixed (Barro, 
2000; Banerjees and Duflo, 2003) relationship between inequality and growth. These outcomes 
legitimated the recovery and development of the eclipsed theoretical justifications of the beneficial effects 
of inequality on growth – first, the fact that greater overall dispersion of income may indicate greater 
economic incentives. Interestingly, the other explanations put forward use, in different ways, the same 
argumentations considered for the opposite case. Thus, inequality may increase when the pace of 
technological change is fast (Barro, 2000; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997), since the subsequent skill adaptation 
of workers, their concentration into high-skill sectors, and strong innovation inflows foster economic 
growth. As regards the role of human capital, if the most productive investments require a minimum 
threshold (high relative to median income), more unequal distributive patterns may be good for growth 
(Barro, 2000). Similarly, Bénabou (1996b) emphasises the positive effects on growth that the 
complementarities of human capital endowment of heterogeneous individuals may produce. In a 
Keynesian setting, as the rich save more than the poor, more inequality would mean more aggregate 
savings, investments and long-run growth (Barro, 2000). On the political economy side, Saint-Paul and 
Verdier (1993) contend that, if higher taxation provides considerable funds for financing, including 
education, this may enhance human capital bases and promote future growth. Li and Zou (1998) adopt a 
theoretical approach similar to that of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), but assuming that government spending 
is wholly driven by public consumption, which enters the individual utility function together with private 
consumption. In a median voter perspective, more equal distributive settings will drive collective 
preferences towards higher income taxes, curbing subsequent growth. 
Lastly, as argued by Forbes (2000), a positive and a negative relationship may not be alternative, since 
they may be valid in different time dimensions. Most of the channels envisaged to transmit negative 
effects from inequality to growth do unfold in the long term. The two-stage political economy argument of 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) is clearly a long-term process, i.e., in the short and medium terms, tax and 
transfer systems may be considered as given. Other factors (e.g., the effects of investments in human 
capital) also typically produce the expected negative effects on growth in the long term. So growth-
promoting factors of income inequality – first of all, the signalling of greater economic incentives – may 
dominate the short and medium term, and give way to negative effects in the long. 
 
2.3 The Regional Dimension of Income Inequality 
  The very few studies conducted at a disaggregated “regional” level have provided interesting 
insights on many aspects. The papers by Topel (1994), Partridge (1997, 2005 and 2006), Fallah and 
Partridge (2006), Panizza (2002), Wu et al. (2006) and Frank (2008) are interesting examples of “state” 
level analyses for the US. As regards Europe, the sub-national level has so far been almost totally 
neglected, exceptions being the work of Galbraith and Garcilazo (2005), the studies referring to the 
regions of single countries (e.g., Goerlich and Mas, 2001; Cannari and D’Alessio, 2003; Monastiriotis, 
2000), and the papers related to the Luxemburg Income Study (see next section). This is to some extent 
surprising, given the strong political interest in regional aspects in Europe, mainly addressed to social 
cohesion targets. In addition, if income inequality influences subsequent growth, regional distributive 
aspects may also gain policy interest in growth/convergence frameworks. 
Beyond these policy aspects and the fact that spatially detailed analyses may uncover remarkable 
within-country differences (Mahler, 2002), motivations to carry out disaggregated regional analysis also 
exist on theoretical grounds. As a premise, if the people’s well-being is not determined in absolute terms 
but by their social and economic condition in society (Runciman, 1966), the more the extent of this   5
“society” represents the real space of economic and social life, the more inequality measurement may be 
informative. From a micro-economic point of view, the regional level of inequality may be the most 
significant one in shaping individuals’ incentives, by supplying direct evidence of the returns achieved in 
the same economic, social and institutional environment (Jesuit et al., 2002; Rainwater et al. 2001). 
As suggested by Partridge (1997) and Panizza (2002), some aspects which are typical of sub-
national levels may gain centrality in explaining inequality and its link with growth, namely factor 
mobility which is normally higher and thus more influential within geographically and culturally 
contiguous areas. In a simplified world where factors of production are perfectly or sufficiently mobile 
across sectors and space to close return differentials (Wildasin, 1995), we should expect the long-run 
adjustment process to produce a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources, with zero inequality across space, 
classes and individuals. However, differences in factor endowments and their specificity may produce 
distributive effects linked to specialisation patterns. In contexts endowed with human and physical capital, 
specialisation in high-skill products, outsourcing of labour-intensive processes, and inward migration of 
unskilled workers may widen the gap between the returns of skilled/unskilled workers, and skilled labour 
and capital (Kim, 1997; Wildasin, 1998), thus fostering inequality. Opposite dynamics may occur in 
poorer regions. Other insights about these aspects may be derived from other streams of the literature, e.g., 
the basic versions of the New Economic Geography (NEG) models, in which the coexistence of sector- 
and space-specific and perfectly mobile productive factors generates the well-known core-periphery 
structure. Although the effects of agglomeration/specialisation patterns on the within (region) component 
of income inequality have not received much scholarly attention so far (one exception is Fallah and 
Partridge, 2006), they may encourage inequality where specific and mobile labour segments coexist (core 
regions) and have the opposite effects in peripheral regions, fully specialised in the traditional sector. 
Although this distributive characterisation may change in more advanced models (Fujita et al., 1999), for 
example with the introduction of rents, these considerations also suggest that factor mobility increases 
income inequality in richer regions and reduces it in poorer ones. 
Greater factor mobility also introduces the important question of the role of institutional, and 
particularly fiscal, competition among regions and its distributive consequences. First of all, factor 
mobility may curtail the ability of regional governments to engage in redistributive actions, thus 
weakening (Partridge, 1997; Panizza, 2002), or inverting (Partridge, 2006), the negative inequality/growth 
conjecture of Persson and Tabellini. Greater labour and capital mobility may indeed, ex-ante discourage 
sub-national governments from engaging in income distribution interventions. Ex-post, mobility may 
inhibit growth in unequal regions which undertake redistributive actions, since factors react to poor 
incentives by migrating and magnifying growth response in the area of destination where incentives are 
better. Redistributive policies, in the presence of capital and labour movements, may even produce 
undesired distributive outcomes. Wildasin (2000, 2006) shows that taxes charged on mobile factors (e.g., 
skilled labour and capital) in order to provide benefits to immobile resources (e.g., low-skilled workers), 
will reduce the amount of mobile resources in the local economy and the returns to the immobile factors, 
which suffer a net loss, also considering the redistribution to them of resources collected. In a dynamic 
framework, mobile factors are perfectly so only in the long run, being afflicted by adjustment costs in the 
short, so that immobile resources may initially enjoy distributive benefits (Wildasin, 2003). However, as 
regards the EU area studied here, despite the general trend of de-centralisation of political and 
administrative functions to regional authorities, the main redistributive tools (i.e., personal income, firms’ 
profits and capital taxation) are decided and implemented at national levels. Therefore, these factors 
should reverberate on cross-country factor mobility which is, although increasing, relatively low for some 
segments of capital and especially labour (e.g., Ederveen et al., 2007). Conversely, the EU’s priority 
objective of economic and social cohesion attributes much importance to regional policies aimed at 
providing material and immaterial infrastructures, firm localisation incentives, subsidies to high-tech 
firms, higher education or R&D activities, public goods which attract high-skilled people, etc. In a simple 
static approach in which mobile and immobile factors coexist (Wildasin, 2000 and 2006), these policies 
may succeed in attracting mobile factors, thus increasing demand and gross returns to immobile factors, 
e.g., unskilled labour. As these measures are financed by resources collected in richer regions (as happens 
with EU structural funds), the gross and net effects on returns to unskilled labour do not diverge. Thus, 
such interventions may not only favour convergence, but also produce a drop in the inequality levels of   6
poorer regions
1. Again, we may then expect lower levels of economic development to be associated with 
lower inequality. 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES ON INEQUALITY MEASURES WITHIN EUROPEAN REGIONS 
  We now provide a description of the available data regarding income inequality within EU regions 
(3.1) and some preliminary descriptive analyses (3.2). 
 
3.1. Data on Income Inequality at the Sub-National Level in the EU 
The scarce availability of sub-national data at European level has so far strongly influenced research 
on the causes and effects of regional inequality. The relatively recent work carried out by the LIS does 
much to fill this gap. The LIS provides harmonised data regarding household incomes, collected in large 
representative household surveys conducted in many European and non-European countries. This means 
that analyses covering differing states can be carried out, providing a number of observations (in our case, 
regions) sufficient to allow econometric analysis. 
Here, we do not use LIS micro data to build inequality measures at the regional level. Rather, we take 
advantage of work already done by others (e.g., Mahler 2002; Jesuit et al., 2002; Forster et al., 2002; 
Hoffmeister, 2006a, 2006b), who use the same data source and make inequality indexes available. In 
particular, we use the two datasets published by Mahler (2002) and Hoffmeister (2006a), which provide 
three inequality measures, fulfilling the three criteria for the minimum qualitative standards suggested by 
Deninger and Squire (1998), i.e., to be based on household surveys, to have coverage of all sources of 
income, and to be representative of the whole population of the unit of analysis. 
The first (henceforth, Mahler) builds regional measures of income inequality for various developed 
countries, including some EU nations, in order to analyse the relationship between inequality and electoral 
turn-outs. The income measure used to calculate inequality measures is the adjusted (disposable) 
household income which, in the LIS harmonisation process, is defined as the income from all sources, net 
of income taxes and mandatory social insurance contributions. This harmonised measure was adjusted by 
Mahler, in order to take into account scale economies within the household, by dividing the household 
income by the square root of the household size, and then weighting the household by the number of its 
family members (Atkinson et al., 1995, pp. 18-21). Thus, incomes are compared at the individual level, 
but accounting for the structure of the household in which those individuals live (Jesuit and Mahler, 2006). 
Of interest here, Mahler provides two inequality indexes: the well-known Gini index, and the 90/10 
percentile ratio, i.e., the ratio of the income of a household at the 90th percentile to that of one at the 10th 
percentile. The data used here, identified in the LIS dataset as Wave IV (i.e., national surveys with 
reference year around 1995), refer to NUTS1 regions of Germany (16 units) and the UK (12), and NUTS2 
regions of France and Italy (22 and 19 units, respectively). Mahler also provides data for Denmark, but at 
the NUTS3 level: this poses issues of size homogeneity with the remaining units and other data 
availability, and therefore these regions were excluded. Similarly, the Mahler dataset distinguishes 
between East and West Berlin but, since the other data used in the following econometric analysis only 
refer to the Berlin region as a whole, these two observations were excluded. Our final “Mahler” dataset is 
therefore composed of 67 regions, listed in table A1 in the appendix. 
The second dataset (henceforth, Hoffmeister) refers to Wave V (around 2000). Like Mahler, 
Hoffmeister uses the LIS variable disposable household income as a starting point, again adjusted for 
household size by dividing the household income by the square root of the household size and thus 
transformed into individual “equivalent” disposable income. As an inequality measure, Hoffmeister 
calculates the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), of the class of generalised entropy indicators. He 
computes and renders the MLD available for 63 regions belonging to 15 European countries: 11 from the 
old EU-15, and 4 from the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 (see table 
A1 for details). The Hoffmeister database ensures a high degree of territorial size homogeneity, since it 
covers all NUTS1 regions with the only exception of Finland, for which the inequality measure is 
provided at the country level, rather than distinguishing the two NUTS1. 
In view of the high variability of outcomes highlighted by the literature with respect to the measure 
employed and the geographical scope, we considered the availability of two geographical datasets and 
three inequality indicators as advantages. In particular, the Gini index and the MLD are well-known to be 
                                                      
1  The introduction of rents may obviously affect these redistributive outcomes, depending on which immobile 
resources are more favoured, on their distribution and initial returns.   7
aggregate measures, and are sensitive to changes in the whole distribution. However, the MLD is more 
sensitive to changes in the lower tail (Hoffmeister, 2006b; Litchfield, 1999). Instead, the 90/10 percentile 
ratio refers to limited sections of the distribution measuring the distance between two groups and is thus 
insensitive to shifts of income within the boundaries, but it does emphasise extreme values. The 
implications for empirical analysis of the differences between the inequality measures are discussed later. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Analyses of Intra-Regional Income Inequality Indicators 
  Table 1 lists some basic descriptive statistics of the three inequality measures considered. In the 
Mahler dataset, the Gini coefficients range between 0.19 for the German regions of Sachsen and 
Thüringen to 0.39 for the region of Sicily (Italy), with a median value below the mean. The percentile 
(90/10) ratio reports the minimum value (2.31) again in the Sachsen region, and the highest (7.02) again in 
Italy (Molise). As the coefficient of variation shows, this measure has greater variability than the Gini 
index. 
 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INEQUALITY MEASURES AT REGIONAL LEVEL FOR SOME EU COUNTRIES 
  Mahler - 1995  Hoffmeister - 2000 
 Gini  90/10  MLD 
Mean 0.29  3.79  0.16 
Median 0.28  3.67  0.16 
Standard deviation  0.05  0.88  0.04 
Minimum 0.19  2.31  0.08 
Maximum 0.39  7.02  0.27 
Coefficient of variation  0.16  0.23  0.27 
 
This is also clear when looking at the plots obtained by the kernel density estimations of Figure 1, 
which may be considered as the continuous equivalents of histograms, in which the number of intervals 
tends towards infinity (Silverman, 1986). For both measures bimodality emerges, but the higher variability 
of the percentile ratio significantly affects the shape of the distribution. However, it is interesting to note 
that the two measures are highly correlated: 0.886 for the Bravais coefficient and 0.908 for the Pearson 
rank correlation index. 
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Figure 1. Kernel density estimations of inequality measures of Mahler - 1995 database 
 
In order to appreciate country differences in the levels and regional dispersions of income 
inequality, we provide country box plots for the two inequality measures (Figure 2).   8
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Figure 2.Box plots of inequality measure of Mahler - 1995 database, by country 
 
The MLD measure (Hoffmeister database) shows a median value almost coinciding with the 
mean, and the lowest and highest levels for German Sachsen and the Italian Islands, respectively. The 
shape of the K-densities are more similar to a normal distribution compared with the previous cases; in the 
box plots, country differences are clearcut in terms of both levels and ranges of regional inequality (Figure 
3). 
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Figure 3. Kernel density estimations and box plots of inequality measure MLD of Hoffmeister - 2000 database 
 
  The strong evidence of these country level differences encouraged formal testing of probable 
spatial autocorrelation patterns of regional inequality levels. Spatial autocorrelation arises when the value 
assumed by a variable in a given place is correlated, positively or negatively, with the value assumed by 
the same variable in a different place or in a set of different places - typically, neighbouring regions. This 
may basically be due to: (a) measurement errors for observations referring to contiguous geographic units; 
(b) actual spatial interaction patterns. Detection of spatial autocorrelation patterns is also an important 
preliminary step to analyses of regional inequality determinants, due to the potential econometric 
problems arising in the presence of contemporaneous correlations, very probably in the form of spatial 
autocorrelations when regional data are employed. Spatial interaction may be highlighted descriptively by 
using, for example, the Moran I spatial correlation index. The technical precondition for its calculation is 
the availability of a weight - or spatial lag - matrix (W), able to express the connections between the 
geographic units considered. Depending on the nature of the phenomenon studied, the weights may be 
represented in various ways. In our case, we considered a classical binary contiguity matrix, the cells of 
which assume value 1 if the corresponding regions have common boundaries, and 0 otherwise. Table 2 
clearly demonstrates the existence of significant and positive spatial autocorrelations in the levels of intra-
regional income inequality. This means that, when a region has a high (low) level of inequality, the 
neighbouring regions also have high (low) values.   9
 
TABLE 2 
SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION: MORAN I INDEX FOR INEQUALITY AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
  Mahler - 1995  Hoffmeister - 2000 
 Gini  90/10  MLD 
Moran I 
Global Spatial Autocorrelation  0.60*** 0.48***  0.55*** 
*** = significant at 1% 
 
  These outcomes clearly indicate that the spatial dimension is one aspect which must be taken into 
account in the following econometric analysis. The diversification of local spatial correlation measures 
referring to each region (not given here), reporting the levels and significance of the correlation between 
its value and those of neighbouring regions, provides evidence that spatial clusters do not necessarily 
reflect national boundaries, i.e, inequality of some “inner” regions is not correlated with that of 
neighbours, and vice versa for “border” regions. 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITY DETERMINANTS AND OF ITS EFFECTS ON GROWTH 
  This section first describes the econometric approach (4.1) used to estimate the existence and 
statistical significance of the relationships (i) between some regional (economic, demographic, 
institutional) features and regional income inequality, and (ii) between regional inequality and subsequent 
growth. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the empirical models and discuss the results. 
 
4.1. Econometric Approach 
The characteristics of the available databases pose severe constraints on the use of econometric 
analysis, and limit it to cross-sectional approaches. The lack of a time dimension of the data on inequality 
prevents the use of panel econometric approaches, recommended in the analysis of the inequality-growth 
relationship in order to reduce the risk of omitted-variable bias due to the existence of unobserved region-
specific features. 
A first analytical step was the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of simple cross-sectional 
models of (i) the economic, demographic and institutional determinates of inequality and (ii) the effects of 
income inequality levels at the beginning of the period on subsequent economic growth. In order to reduce 
possible omissions of country-level factors, we included country variables in the models (in the form of 
dummy or institutional variables). 
For the three datasets (Mahler-Gini and Mahler-90/10, which refer to 1995; and Hoffmeister-MLD, 
which refers to 2000), the baseline cross-sectional OLS model for region i is: 
 
Ineqi = α (Econ)i  + β (Demo)i + γ (Inst)i + μ (Country)i + εi     [1] 
 
where Ineqi is the inequality measure, Econi and Demoi are baskets of regional economic/structural and 
demographic variables, respectively, and Insti is a set of institutional variables, which are common to the 
regions belonging to the same country, adjusted when possible with regional features. These explanatory 
variables are described in detail section 4.2.1, and their relationship with inequality is hypothesised on the 
basis of a discussion of the specific literature. Countryi is the set of the country dummy variables capturing 
common national effects; for each country the dummy is one for all the regions belonging to the country, 
and zero otherwise. α, β, γ and μ are the corresponding vectors of coefficients, and εi is the error term. 
On the basis of the theoretical and empirical contributions considered in section 2.2, we also estimated 
a regional growth regression, including the effects of income inequality. So, we firstly estimated the 
following OLS cross-sectional models of GDP growth for region i, including inequality among the 
determinants: 
 
ΔGDPi, = κ(GDP)i + ϕ(Ineq)i + τ (Contr)i + μ (Country)i + εi     [2] 
 
where  ΔGDPi is the average annual per capita GDP (in PPP) growth rate for region i in the period 
considered, and GDPi and Ineqi are log per capita GDP (in PPP) and the inequality level of region i at the 
beginning of the period, respectively. Contri is a set of control variables observed at, or close to, the   10
beginning of the period, and includes human capital, industry mix indicators
2 and R&D expenditures; 
Countryi is again the set of the country dummy variables capturing common national effects. κ, ϕ, τ  and μ 
are the corresponding vectors of coefficients, and εi is the error term. 
Based on the descriptive evidence of significant and positive spatial autocorrelation of regional 
inequality, we estimated spatial autoregressive models able to take into account spatial interactions, also in 
order to capture unobserved region-specific features which have spatial dependence. As highlighted by the 
econometric literature (e.g., Anselin, 1998, 1999; Atzeni et al., 2004), the traditional spatial autoregressive 
models may present: (a) the dependent variable correlated with its spatial lag (spatial LAG model); (b) the 
error term affected by spatial autocorrelation (spatial ERROR model); or (c) both spatial LAG and 
ERROR correlations. In the simplest formal terms, if W is the weight - or spatial lag - matrix, the starting 
point is: 
 
y = ρ W y + X β + ε           [ 3 ]  
 
where: 
ε = λ W ε + η; 
η ~ N (0, O), and the diagonal elements of the O covariance matrix of the errors Oij = hi (zϖ); 
β is a vector Kx1 of parameters associated with the explanatory variables X (matrix N x K); 
ρ is the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable; 
λ is the coefficient of a spatial autoregressive structure for disturbance ε. 
We have a spatial LAG model if λ = ϖ = 0 and y = ρ W y + X β + ε. We have a spatial ERROR 
model if ρ = ϖ = 0 and y = X β + (I - λ W)
-1 η. In the first case, a typical omitted-variable problem arises 
and OLS estimation would produce biased and inconsistent estimates; these problems may be addressed 
using Maximum Likelihood (ML), Instrumental Variables and Robust approach estimates. It is also 
possible that correcting for the spatial lag of the dependent variable makes the error spatial autocorrelation 
disappear. Methods of estimations alternative to OLS are also recommended in the case of spatial ERROR 
correlation, since OLS would produce inefficient estimates. In this empirical analysis, we ran ML 
estimates of spatial LAG and spatial ERROR models using the spatial econometric application available in 
STATA (Pisati, 2001), which unfortunately does not allow the most general model (with both spatial LAG 
and ERROR) to be estimated. As done for the descriptive spatial autocorrelation, we used a binary weight 
matrix (row standardised). 
In our specific case, the ML spatial autoregressive spatial LAG and spatial ERROR models for 
inequality determinants become, respectively: 
 
Ineqi = ρ W (Ineq)i + α (Econ)i  + β (Demo)i + γ (Inst)i + μ (Country)i + εi  [4] 
 
and: 
 
Ineqi = α (Econ)i  + β (Demo)i  + γ (Inst)i + μ (Country)i + λ W εi + ηi    [5] 
 
in which the symbols are the same as those described for equations 1 and 3. 
Similarly, spatial LAG and ERROR estimates of the growth models are: 
 
ΔGDPi= ρ W (ΔGDPi) + κGDPi + ϕ (Ineq)i + τ (Contr)i + μ (Country)i + εi   [6] 
 
and: 
 
ΔGDPi = κ(GDP)i + ϕ(Ineq)i + τ (Contr)i + μ (Country)i + λ W εi + ηi    [7] 
 
with the notations assuming the same meanings as in equations 2 and 3. 
A final major threat to the present econometric analysis is specific to estimates of the inequality-
growth relationship which, as mentioned in section 2.2, may be subject to reverse causation. This effect 
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can be ruled out if the explanatory variables of interest – as, in our case, the level of regional inequality – 
are measured at the beginning of the period considered for growth, and thus are statistically predetermined 
(Alesina and Rodrick, 1994; Partridge, 1997). However, it is possible that other factors simultaneously 
influence inequality and growth. For example, previous growth rates may influence both present 
inequality and subsequent growth; similarly, in the convergence theory, the initial level of economic 
development affects subsequent growth but, according to Kuznets’ conjecture, also contemporaneous 
inequality. Therefore, to be sure that these factors did not influence outcomes obtained with OLS, we also 
estimated the inequality/growth relationship using instrumental-variables (IV) two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) regressions. The IV approach could not be combined with the spatial regressions since this 
estimation option is not available in the software application used for them. 
 
4.2. Inequality Determinants in European Regions 
Before presenting the outcomes of our estimations, we briefly introduce the meaning associated with 
the specific explanatory variables and their expected relationships with inequality, hypothesised on the 
basis of existing literature (all variables are defined and listed in table A2 of the appendix). The small 
number of observations (see table A1) suggested including only a limited set of explanatory variables in 
the econometric models. For these reasons, and also in order to reduce collinearity problems, we reduced 
the number of regressors by eliminating the most important correlations and redundancies by applying, 
where possible, principal component analysis (PCA). In addition, we only present as final outcomes 
parsimonious estimations in which we kept the most important regressors from the theoretical viewpoint 
and those highlighting a certain stability of sign, size and significance of the estimated coefficient when 
other explanatory variables were included/dropped. All the economic/structural (Econ) and demographic 
(Demo) variables are drawn from the on-line Eurostat regio database. The few missing data were 
reconstructed by means of linear interpolation. 
 
4.2.1. Explanatory variables and their expected impact on inequality 
The first specific variable of interest is of course the regional level of economic development. Its 
measure was obtained here by means of PCA on four strongly correlated indicators, i.e., per capita GDP 
(in PPP), employment rates in agriculture and market services, and population density; this new variable 
was named DEV
3. From the theoretical point of view, the relationship between development and 
inequality has been traditionally described as an inverted U-shape (Kuznets, 1955; Robinson, 1976), as a 
result of the dynamics of relative wages occurring during the transition from a rural/agricultural to an 
urban/industrial economy. However, as shown for example by Davis (1992) and Freeman and Katz 
(1994), this may not be the case for current economic development patterns, which are associated with 
declining shares of manufacturing or its low-tech segments (which harm blue-collar workers), increasing 
urbanisation, and tertiary specialisation. The latter is typically characterised by a bimodal pay structure 
(Bishop et al., 1991) reflecting the relative roles of advanced versus traditional services. Therefore, more 
developed regional systems may be associated with increasing inequality
4. This possibility is reinforced 
by the role played by factor mobility in shaping regional specialisation patterns (see also the discussion in 
section 2.3). Higher earnings dispersion may be expected in regions more endowed with human and 
physical capital as a result of specialisation in capital-intensive products, outsourcing of labour-intensive 
processes (eased by capital mobility), and inward migration of unskilled workers (Kim, 1997; Wildasin, 
1998; Borjas et al., 1992; Topel, 1994). Similarly, in an NEG framework, core regions may undergo 
higher inequality due to the co-existence of space-specific and mobile labour segments, while returns are 
more homogeneous in peripheral areas specialised in the traditional industry. Lastly, the possible 
consequences of the EU cohesion policy (see section 2.3) may lead poorer regions to face lower inequality 
if measures targeted at attracting mobile factors, thus increasing demand and gross returns to immobile 
factors, e.g., unskilled labour, are successful. On these bases, the first hypothesis we test is that income 
inequality grows as the regional level of development increases. 
                                                      
3 This is the first factor resulting from the PCA, which extracts 67% of the total variance in 1995 and 66% in 2000, 
and is positively correlated with GDP, DENS and ER_mkt_serv, and negatively with ER_agri. 
4 This line of argument also envisages the possibility of an inversion in the relationship (therefore, recovery of an 
inverted U-shape), which may take place after a development level which corresponds to economies very (or fully) 
specialised in skill-intensive sectors.   12
A second group of variables belonging to the Econ set aims at more explicitly representing the complex 
effects of technical change and the evolution of labour demand towards skilled labour. The variables 
available at regional level used to represent these aspects are measures of innovative input (R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP), innovative output (patent applications per million inhabitants - 
INN) and human capital, approximated by indicators of various levels of education (HC, HC_1, HC_2) of 
the resident population (see definitions in table A2). As usual in the empirical literature (e.g., Panizza, 
2002; Barro, 2000; Partridge et al., 1996), we use these measures of formal education of the population to 
capture the qualitative evolutions of interest occurring in the labour market. The impact of quantitative 
aspects is considered later, by means of labour market performance indicators. Our expectations about the 
link of skills endowment and technological change with inequality are derived from Aghion et al. (1999). 
In their model, growing earnings inequality is explained by acceleration of the relative demand for skills 
due to technical change, which in turn increases the skill premium
5. In developed economies, this is due to 
three factors: (i) increased trade; (ii) skill-biased technical change (SBTC), and (iii) organisational change 
within firms. Therefore, we test the existence of a positive relationship between innovation activity and 
human capital indicators, and inequality. 
Once the effects of technical change and skills have been controlled for, we also test the impacts 
of aggregate measures of labour market performances and features on inequality. The variables available 
at regional level include first of all four traditional performance indicators - total and female employment 
rates, and unemployment and long-term unemployment rates – which showed very high levels of 
correlation and were again summed by PCA. The first factor extracted, named LAB_MKT_PERF, explains 
85% of the total variance in 1995 and 83% in 2000. Other indicators considered were part-time and self- 
employment rates (only measured after 1999) which also clearly signal labour market institutional 
settings, and the age structure of employment. The links between labour market performance and 
inequality are complex from a theoretical point of view, and uncertain on empirical grounds (Burniaux et 
al., 2006). On one hand, better performances may be associated with lower economic exclusion and less 
discouraged workers, therefore with non-zero earnings of otherwise unemployed or inactive persons, and 
thus reduced inequality. On the other hand, greater participation rates on the part of certain segments of 
the labour force – e.g., women or young people - may produce pressures on unskilled wages and favour 
inequality (e.g., Topel, 1994). However, the new labour suppliers do not necessarily compete with low-
wage groups (e.g., new female labour supply is often highly educated and competes with high-skilled 
males); in any case, the eventual downward wage effect only leads to earnings inequality, whereas higher 
inclusion (even though of low-wage earners) may integrate household incomes positively (e.g., Bradbury, 
1990; Partridge et al., 1996; Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999). Since all our inequality measures are 
derived from household incomes, the prevalence of the inequality-reducing effect of a more inclusive 
labour market, also in terms of young (aged 15 to 24 years) and older (55-64) workers, may be 
hypothesised
6, so we test the existence of a negative relationship between labour market performance (and 
young and old employment rates) and inequality. 
As regards the relative importance of self-employment, the existing literature mainly addresses the 
possibility of a positive relationship with inequality (e.g., Falter, 2007; Parker, 1999; Meager et al., 1996; 
Jenkins, 1995). Intuitively, this is due to the fact that self-employment incomes are more dispersed than 
incomes of employees, as a result of the higher and increasing heterogeneity of self-employed workers 
(e.g., Meager et al., 1994; Parker, 1997) and of the movements in the relatively greater transitory 
component of income (e.g., Albarrán et al., 2007). A growing share of self-employed workers increases 
the weight of their within component of, and thus overall, income inequality. Therefore we empirically test 
the existence of the positive impact of the growing self-employment share on inequality. 
  Due to scanty availability of data, the set of demographic variables (Demo) is very small, and the 
most interesting aspects, such as average age or ethnicity, language and religious heterogeneity (Barro, 
2000; Topel, 1994) could not be considered. We were only able to include in the regressions the share of 
                                                      
5 The discussion refers here to earnings inequality. As clearly stressed by Atkinson and Brandolini (2006), the 
distribution of individual earnings, due to the relative importance of labour incomes, is closely related to household 
income distribution. However, they also differ for the other income sources and the distributive role played by the 
household. 
6 Similar conjectures may be made with regard to the effects of diffusion of part-time employment, although this 
aspect is more directly used in the literature to represent the disadvantaged positions of (typically female) workers 
locked in low-wage traps (e.g., Stier and Lewin-Epstain, 2000; McManus, 2007). For these reasons, it is harder to 
hypothesise, a priori, its relationship with inequality, which depends on which effects prevail.   13
population aged 65 years or over, which is essentially used as a control variable. However, although 
variables measuring the dependency-burden have not attracted much attention so far (exceptions are 
Panizza, 2002, and Partridge et al., 1996), a positive relationship of POP>65 and inequality may be 
conjectured, due to the fact that people in dependent ages often have lower equivalent incomes than those 
in work-active ages (Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999). 
Lastly, in order to consider the important effects attributed by theory to institutional settings
7, we first 
included in set Inst three country-level labour market institutional variables all provided by the OECD, i.e, 
union density, degree of bargaining centralisation, and degree of bargaining coordination. All three 
indicators were weighted by the regional share of dependent employment, since they primarily influence 
this segment. Besides the effects of flexible contractual arrangements noted earlier, stronger unions (e.g., 
Card et al., 2003; Card, 2001; Kahn, 2000; Machin, 1997; Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Di Nardo et al., 
1996) and more centralised and coordinated bargaining (e.g., Manacorda, 2004; Erickson and Ichino, 
1995; Edin and Holmlund, 1995) are thought to compress wage distributions by standardising pay rates 
among workers within an establishment and across establishments, thus fostering equality (Blanchflower 
and Slaughter, 1999). A fourth institutional feature examined is the level of expenditure on social 
protection benefits (WELF), as a percentage of the GDP at country level, provided by Eurostat. Although 
limited budgets may increase benefit efficiency (Tullock, 1997), more generous redistributive or welfare 
systems are usually thought to reduce inequality (e.g., Gottschalk, 1993; Partridge et al., 1996), albeit at 
the expense of efficiency and future growth. Therefore, we expect stronger union density and collective 
bargaining to reduce inequality. Similarly, we test the existence of a negative relationship between the 
size of the welfare system and inequality. 
 
4.2.2. Results 
Table 3 lists the results of the specification of equations 1, 4 and 5 using the two inequality 
measures provided in the Mahler dataset
8. Subsequently, we ran similar regressions for the Hoffmeister 
database (table 4). In order to have directly comparable OLS and ML estimates, we restricted the Mahler 
and Hoffmeister samples to 63 and 58 observations, respectively. Indeed, when running spatial 
econometric regressions, the availability of a contiguity (binary) matrix of weights entails the exclusion of 
observations with non-neighbours (i.e., fr83-Corse, itg1-Sicily, itg2-Sardinia and ukm-Northern Ireland 
for the Mahler dataset; and 
 ee0-Estonia, gr4-Nisia Aigaiou.-Kriti, es7-Canarias, itd-Island-Italy and ie0-
Ireland
 in the Hoffmeister sample). 
In table 3, the baseline regressions of columns 1 and 6 supply a first interesting piece of 
information, first of all related to the positive sign of the development variable (DEV), which is consistent 
with the conjectured roles of factor mobility and urban/tertiary specialisation. However, the coefficient is 
statistically significant in the first regression only, and the same occurs if DEV is replaced by the variables 
used in the PCA from which it derives. In order to test the possibility of a quadratic relationship, we also 
inserted squared DEV in the model, but this term was never significant. Similarly, the human capital 
coefficient (HC_2) is not statistically significant, as in the rest of regressions, except for the model in 
column 7. The same happens if we consider other indicators (HC and HC_1). However, it should be noted 
that the impact of HC_2 on inequality, although almost always not significant, is steadily positive when 
the inequality measure is the decile ratio, which attributes relatively more importance to the tails of the 
distribution, and thus to the role played to top earners relative to bottom ones. However, all our HC 
variables refer to 1999, since previous data were not available, so that definitive comments on their effects 
on inequality cannot be drawn. 
As regards the effects produced by technological change, the innovation output indicator (strongly 
correlated with the input variable R&D) is steadily significant and positive, corroborating the idea that 
                                                      
7 We are aware of the possibility of endogeneity of institutional settings to inequality levels, but the data available 
did not allow us to address these problems here. 
8 The usual diagnostic tests were run for the final models. For models with GINI as dependent variable, no problems 
of heteroschedasticity (Cook-Wiseberg and White tests), collinearity (VIF) or non-normality of error (Jarque-Bera 
test) emerged. Similarly, the Ramsey test did not provide evidence of omitted variables, and the few outliers detected 
using the Cook distance did not prove to be influential on the signs or significance of the coefficients. Similar results 
were obtained using 90/10 as dependent variable but, in this case, the Jarque-Bera test for normality of error terms 
was slightly below the acceptance level. However, the outcomes are very robust to the inclusion/exclusion of 
variables and observations and transformations of dependent variables. The emergence of heteroschedasticity in a 
few estimates suggested using robust estimation.   14
higher innovative intensity may entail more frequent skill - and therefore employment – adjustments and 
more segmented labour demand, thus leading to greater inequality. The labour market summary indicator 
(LAB_MKT_PERF) also assumes the hypothesised negative sign, confirming that inequality depends to a 
considerable extent on the functioning and efficiency of the labour market. Similarly, when the labour 
market is able to include young workers (EMPL_15-24) inequality decreases; however, the coefficients 
are not statistically significant in these baseline estimations. The demographic variable (POP>65) is not 
significant. Among the labour market institutional variables which are corrected at regional level, only 
CENTR_adj is steadily significant, and supports the expectation that a higher level of bargaining 
centralisation favours less unequal income structures. 
In a second OLS specification (columns 2 and 7), we included the indicator of social protection 
benefits WELF, which is available at country level. Consistently with the literature predictions and our 
expectation, the WELF coefficient is significant and negative for both inequality measures. Its inclusion in 
the models slightly improves their explanatory power. 
Considering the outcomes of the descriptive analysis, which highlighted strong country level 
differences in regional inequality levels (Figures 2 and 3), we also carried out specifications including 
country dummy variables (columns 3 and 8). This also aimed at assessing if the variables used in the 
previous specification (in particular, WELF) already captured the national component of the variability of 
regional inequality. The outcomes suggest that the models with country effects (WELF was not included, 
in order to avoid collinearity with the dummies) have higher explanatory power compared with the 
previous ones, and the signs and significance of the other explanatory variables remain stable. This 
evidence means that the country dummies not only include the important information of WELF, but also 
introduce other unobserved country-specific features which influence regional inequality. The importance 
of country dummies for the specification is also confirmed by the F test for their joint significance. 
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TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL INCOME INEQUALITY, MAHLER - 1995 DATABASE 
  GINI (x 100)  90/10 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
ML (S. Lag) 
(4) 
ML (S. Error) 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8)
# 
ML (S. Lag) 
(9)
# 
ML (S. Error) 
(10)
# 
DEV    0.41*    0.21    0.21    0.35    0.35    0.06    0.02    0.03    0.05    0.05 
HC_2  -1.41    9.60  -5.45  -0.19  -0.72    1.42    3.75*    0.62    1.49    1.49 
INN    0.02***    0.01***    0.01**    0.01***    0.01***    0.00***    0.00***    0.00**    0.00***    0.00*** 
LAB_MKT_PERF -0.81***  -0.55*  -0.55*  -0.69**  -0.74**  -0.28*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.28*** 
EMPL_15-24 -2.86  -21.74  -49.71**  -7.36  -7.53  -1.02  -2.96***  -7.35    0.39    0.69 
CENTR_adj  -6.26***  -6.18*** -10.64*  -5.44*** -6.38***  -1.03*** -1.01*** -3.36*  -0.93*** -1.04*** 
WELF  -  -0.53**  -  - -  - -0.11*  -  - - 
UK_d  -  -     1.16  - - - -  -1.05  - - 
Germany_d  -  -    7.67*  -  -  -  -    2.97*  -  - 
Italy_d  -  -     0.18  - - - -  -0.43  - - 
Constant   38.30***   52.81***   49.73***  32.70***  38.88***    4.81***    7.88***    9.53***    4.24***    4.86*** 
n. of observations  63  63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
F  18.94***  17.70***  15.99***  - - 10.56***  9.87***  10.13***  - - 
Log Likelihood  -  - - -147.69  -148.02  - - - -56.73  -57.03 
F (dummy variables)  -  - 4.01**  - - - - 2.60*  - - 
R
2  0.67  0.69  0.73  - - 0.53  0.56  - - - 
Adjusted R
2  0.63  0.65 0.69 -  -  0.48 0.50 0.62 -  - 
Sq. corr. (pseudo R
2)  -  - - 0.69  0.67  - - - 0.55  0.53 
ρ / λ  -  -  -    0.16    0.11  -  -  -  0.12  0.06 
Wald Test (ρ/λ = 0)  -  -  -    0.94    0.29  -  -  -  0.61  0.07 
Likel. R. Test (ρ/λ =0)  -  -  -    0.94    0.28  -  -  -  -  - 
Lagr. M. Test (ρ/λ =0)  -  -  -    2.90*    1.57  -  -  -  2.52  1.14 
For full definition of the variables, see Table A2 in the Appendix 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
# Robust estimates in order to account for heterosckedasticity 
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Columns 4, 5, 9 and 10 list the estimates of the ML spatial and error models without imposing ex-
ante any spatial structure, i.e., not including country dummies or the country level variable WELF. These 
ML regressions turned out to be very similar to the OLS estimates in terms of coefficient signs and 
significance. Comparison of the measures of overall explanatory power between OLS with country 
dummies and ML models indicate that the information included in the spatial pattern of income inequality 
is fully captured by the country dummies and other variables. In addition, the non-significance of 
coefficients ρ and λ in the ML estimates also suggest that the other regressors already account for the 
spatial pattern of inequality which is not closely related to national differences. 
A final general comment on table 3 regards the overall strong consistency of the outcomes obtained 
using the two inequality measures as dependent variables, the only exception being the significance levels 
of a few coefficients. This fits with the high levels of correlation of the two measures and also the findings 
of Li et al. (1998, p.37). 
  Table 4 lists the models estimated using the MLD of the Hoffmeister dataset. Although 
comparison with the previous outcomes of table 3 is difficult due to the many remarkable differences 
among the samples, we report regressions obtained considering the same explanatory variables as the OLS 
models of table 3 in the first three columns of table 4. Comparison reveals strong and interesting 
differences: only the negative impact of CENTR_adj is confirmed, whereas DEV is again positively 
associated with inequality, but the coefficient is steadily significant. Instead, the coefficient of HC_2 is 
positive, and close to the 10% significance level only in the first two models; INN, LAB_MKT_PERF and 
EMPL_15-24 are never statistically significant. So - not surprisingly considering especially the different 
geographies of the samples- the determinants of distributive patterns in the second one must be sought 
elsewhere, as the poor value of the adjusted R
2 also testifies. However, a first indication comes from the 
comparison of the three initial OLS models. The inclusion of WELF does not particularly improve the 
explanatory power of the model (column 2), but this is not the case for the n-1 country dummies (column 
3). Some of them - all the CEEC and Finland - enter the regression significantly and, most importantly, the 
country effects are jointly significant (see the F test): as a result, the adjusted R
2 more than doubles 
compared with the previous specification. This is clearly explained by the fact that the sample includes 
very different countries from various points of view, particularly transition countries. In the subsequent 
regressions, we show the results obtained by including other explanatory variables which were not 
significant (squared DEV) or not available (SELF_e) for the previous samples. Except for model 4, the 
coefficient of squared DEV enters the models with a negative and significant sign. This outcome, together 
with the steadily significant and positive coefficient of DEV, supports the existence of a quadratic 
relationship. However, the DEV threshold at which the relationship becomes negative is very high and 
only three well-known development outlier regions exceed this value (Brussels, Hamburg, London). This 
prevailing positive, although marginally decreasing, link corroborates our conjectures about the role of 
factor mobility on inequality in developed, service-specialised contexts. The variable SELF_e also enters 
regression 5 (and the following ones) positively and significantly, as we hypothesised arguing that 
“extreme” earners – e.g., professionals on one hand and flexible workers on the other – are often self-
employed. 
Interesting information comes from comparison of regressions 5 and 6, which differ in the 
inclusion of country dummies. In model 5, the inclusion of SELF_e renders all the country dummies not 
significant (both singularly and jointly, as testified by the F test), and produces strong collinearity in the 
regression (the mean of variance inflation factors – VIF – is 74.31). If we drop these country effects 
(model 6), the value of adjusted R
2 decreases, although not drastically, and collinearity problems are also 
reduced (mean VIF = 2.39). These outcomes suggest that much of the national variability is captured by 
the variable SELF_e. Similar results are obtained by adding PART_e to the specification (model 7). The 
new variable holds a positive and significant coefficient, and further increases the adjusted R
2. If, in order 
to control the robustness of the previous results, we re-include the country dummies (model 8), they are 
again not significant, and further muticollinearity emerges (mean VIF = 78.97), which alters the whole 
specification. The explanatory power of the model again increases and reaches its highest value (adjusted 
R
2 0.64) when we also include WELF in model 9, where of course the country dummies are no longer 
considered. So, unsurprisingly since they also reveal important institutional features, SELF_e, PART_e 
and WELF can account for the very important existing national differences, and their use, instead of the 12 
country dummies, allows important gains in terms of degrees of freedom of the regressions.  
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TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL INCOME INEQUALITY, HOFFMEISTER – 2000 DATABASE; DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MLD 
(X100) 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
DEV    0.75*    0.79*    1.38***  1.60***  2.15***  1.45*** 
HC_2    8.65    10.70  -10.04  -8.44  -15.54  14.14* 
INN    0.00    0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
LAB_MKT_PERF    0.17    0.07  -0.14  -0.03  0.27  0.20 
EMPL_15-24 -20.24  -18.62  -4.42  -5.42  14.03  32.01 
CENTR_adj -2.64***  -2.46***  -9.93*** -11.79** 1.96  -2.23*** 
WELF -  -0.24  -  -  -  - 
DEV
2  - - - -0.10  -0.25*  -0.16* 
SELF_e    - - - - 66.10*  46.02*** 
PART_e  - - - - - - 
UK_d  - - -10.84  -14.06    8.82  - 
Belgium_d  -  -    0.90    0.79  -0.03  - 
Finland_d  -  -   16.66**   19.70**  -5.21  - 
Germany_d  -  -    0.33    0.29  -0.80  - 
Greece_d  - - -0.59  -1.71  -3.76  - 
Hungary_d  - - -14.84*  -17.66**    3.66  - 
Austria_d  - - -2.65  -2.53  -3.42  - 
Italy_d  - - -7.97  -10.22  -4.18  - 
Luxembourg_d  - - -4.20  -3.97  -4.69  - 
Poland_d  - - -12.48*  -14.76*    4.87  - 
Slovenia_d  - - -17.55**  -20.36**    4.24  - 
Spain_d  -  -    4.76   4.20   1.46  - 
Constant 21.50***  26.34***  40.50*** 45.28*** 2.02  6.81* 
n. of observations  58  58 58 58 58 58 
F  4.36*** 4.08*** 5.56*** 5.23*** 5.34*** 9.36*** 
Log Likelihood  - - - - - - 
F (dummy variables)  - - 4.40***  4.40***  1.68  - 
R
2  0.34 0.36 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.60 
Adjusted R
2  0.26 0.28 0.59 0.59 0.64 0.54 
Sq. corr. (pseudo R
2)  - - - - - - 
ρ / λ  - - - - - - 
Wald Test (ρ/λ = 0)  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Likel. R. Test (ρ/λ =0)  - - - - - - 
Lagr. M. Test (ρ/λ =0)  - - - - - - 
           (continued)  
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL INCOME INEQUALITY, HOFFMEISTER – 2000 DATABASE; DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MLD 
(X100) 
 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
ML (S. Lag) 
(10) 
ML (S. Error) 
(11) 
DEV    1.41***    2.16***    1.50***    1.33***   1.42*** 
HC_2    9.59  -16.16   10.38*    8.61   9.87 
INN  -0.00    0.00    0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
LAB_MKT_PERF    0.41    0.26    0.43    0.38    0.42 
EMPL_15-24   33.64   13.01   34.38   30.44   34.01 
CENTR_adj  -1.84***    2.10  -1.30**  -1.76***  -1.82 
WELF  - - -0.45***  - - 
DEV
2 -0.17*  -0.25  -0.21**  -0.16*  -0.16* 
SELF_e    49.15***   66.80   51.30***   46.62***   49.18*** 
PART_e   15.46*  -1.46   27.71***   14.81**   15.59** 
UK_d  -    9.15  -  -  - 
Belgium_d  - -0.12  - - - 
Finland_d  - -5.56  - - - 
Germany_d  - -0.84  - - - 
Greece_d  - -4.06  - - - 
Hungary_d  -    3.61  -  -  - 
Austria_d  - -3.53  - - - 
Italy_d  - -4.37  - - - 
Luxembourg_d  - -4.91  - - - 
Poland_d  -    4.87  -  -  - 
Slovenia_d  -    4.22  -  -  - 
Spain_d  -    1.27  -  -  - 
Constant    4.26***    2.12   12.06***    3.89    4.11*** 
n. of observations  58  58 58 58 58 
F  9.18*** 4.95*** 10.95***  -  - 
Log Likelihood  - - - -134.48  -134.67 
F (dummy variables)  - 1.40  - - - 
R
2  0.63 0.74 0.70 -  - 
Adjusted R
2  0.56 0.59 0.64 -  - 
Sq. corr. (pseudo R
2)  - - - 0.64  0.63 
ρ / λ  - - - 0.07  -0.03 
Wald Test (ρ/λ = 0)  -  -  -  0.41  0.03 
Likel. R. Test (ρ/λ =0)  - - - 0.41  0.03 
Lagr. M. Test (ρ/λ =0)  - - - 0.50  0.00 
For full definition of the variables, see Table A2 in the Appendix 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
 
Spatial econometric models were also estimated according to the last specification, but without 
imposing any a priori spatial structure (in terms of country dummies or country level variables). Again the 
findings reveal the very great similarity of outcomes obtained by the OLS and ML approaches. 
Other results are noteworthy in the final models estimated. The highest levels of human capital 
(tertiary education) show a predominantly positive impact on inequality (when it is positive and not 
significant at 10%, its significance is always only slightly higher than this level). This provides support to 
our expectations of a positive relationship. Another distinctive piece of evidence is that the importance of  
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quantitative labour market features is replaced by qualitative aspects. The summary measure 
LAB_MKT_PERF is never significant but, beyond the status of the self-employed, the incidence of part-
time employment also positively and significantly affects inequality. This positive impact suggests that 
this indicator may be a good explicit proxy for the strength of disadvantaged positions of low-wage 
workers, who are also probably able to exert downward pressure on certain wages (Barro, 2000). 
As at least partly expected considering the differences in our datasets and variables, the outcomes 
obtained in this section are diversified. Nonetheless, they in general corroborate our expectations and 
indicate that the bulk of regional income inequality levels may be identified in the quantitative and 
qualitative features of regional labour markets, together with institutional differences at national levels. 
Although this is only preliminary empirical evidence restricted to a limited set of measurable aspects, it 
does confirm the centrality of labour market policies and reforms, also in addressing inequality issues. 
This is a major concern for Europe, in view of the diversity in institutional arrangements and the 
extraordinary variability of performance and dynamics of regional labour markets. 
 
4.3. The Inequality-Growth Nexus in European Regions 
We present here a set of econometric specifications of regional growth in which GDPi and Ineqi 
are always included as explanatory variables, and the other variables are considered to control for the sign 
and significance of the Ineqi coefficient. Growth rates were measured as an average percent GDP growth 
over a 10-year period (1995-2004) for Mahler and a 5-year period (2000-2004) for Hoffmeister, 
respectively. For each dataset we estimated OLS, IV-2SLS, ML spatial LAG and ML spatial ERROR 
models. As already mentioned, with respect to OLS, the IV-2SLS approach is preferable since it allows 
controlling for the existence of systematic relations between inequality and growth. As regards the spatial 
econometric models, consistent with a large existing literature (e.g., Benito and Ezcurra, 2005; Paci and 
Pigliaru, 2002; Moreno et al., 2005) the spatially lagged dependent variable is always significant and 
positive in the ML spatial LAG models, and, as already explained, this specification allows addressing the 
well-known problems of omitted variable bias in models with a spatial structure. For these reasons, and for 
the sake of brevity, we present IV-2SLS and spatial LAG models (the latter in the appendix), whereas the 
tables of OLS and spatial ERROR estimates are rendered available at 
http://www.unipg.it/~perugini/roiw.htm.  
Tables 5 and A3 report results for the Mahler dataset using the Gini index as inequality measure. 
The 2SLS estimates
9 show that the usually employed variables (the convergence term measuring initial 
GDP and HC) generally have the expected signs; although with poor statistical significance, the 
employment rate in the primary and secondary sectors are negatively related to growth, whereas opposite 
evidence emerges for services. R&D appears in the models with a not significant sign. As regards 
geographic dummies, those for Italy and France proved to be the only permanently significant ones. 
As regards the outcome of interest here, regional income inequality at the beginning of the period 
considered emerges as beneficial to subsequent regional per capita GDP growth, as witnessed by the 
significant positive sign of the corresponding coefficients, the levels of which hold quite steady. 
Compared with those of the OLS estimates, the coefficients of the IV-2SLS are always higher: thus, if a 
bias exists in the OLS, it does not cast doubts on the positive sign of the inequality/growth relationship. 
The ML spatial LAG estimates (table A3) confirm the positive sign of the Ineq coefficients; however, 
their significance is lower (but only in one case below the usual acceptance levels) and their size is 
reduced. Therefore, the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable, which is always positive and 
strongly significant, allows accounting for the spatial structure of the data which is otherwise captured, at 
least partly, by our variable of interest. The spatial error models confirm the reduction in the size and 
significance of the coefficients of Ineq, but the spatial lag on the errors is poorly significant and the 
explanatory power of the models drops remarkably compared to the previous ones. 
                                                      
9 The instruments for the inequality measure are listed at the bottom of the table, selected according to information 
supplied in the previous estimates, and enter the first-stage regressions significantly.  
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TABLE 5 
EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY ON REGIONAL % GROWTH 1995-2004, MAHLER -1995 DATABASE (IV-2SLS
#) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
GDP  (log)  -0.89**  -0.73**  -0.97**  -0.74** -0.98** -0.73**  -1.26** 
GINI  11.94***  10.04***  10.22***   9.63***   9.68***  10.13***   9.96*** 
HC  -   7.26***   6.93***   7.33***   5.81***   7.26***   5.28*** 
ER_AGRI  -  -  -0.07  - - -  -0.07 
ER_IND  - - -   0.00  -  - - 
ER_SERV  - - - -    0.02  -   0.00 
R_D  -  -  -  - - -0.00    0.00 
D_Italy  -1.93***   0.90   0.90   0.94   0.66   0.89   0.63 
D_France  -0.62***   1.37***   1.38***   1.38***   1.11**   1.36***   1.09* 
Constant   9.72***   3.11   5.69   3.17   5.65   3.00   8.67 
Observations    63    63    63    63    63    63    63 
Adjusted R
2   0.53   0.67   0.67   0.67   0.67   0.66   0.66 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
GDP  (log)  -0.49 -0.36 -0.63 -0.40  -0.76*  -0.37 -1.12* 
90/10 ratio   0.65***   0.58***   0.59***   0.68***   0.56***  0.58***   0.58*** 
HC  -   8.31***   7.93***   8.58***   5.95**   8.30***   5.25* 
ER_AGRI  -  -  -0.08  - - -  -0.08 
ER_IND  - - - 0.02  -  - - 
ER_SERV  - - - -    0.03  -   0.04 
R_D  -  -  -  - -   0.00    0.03 
D_Italy  -1.91***   1.31*   1.32*   1.42*   0.90   1.31*   0.88 
D_France  -0.51**   1.75***   1.78***   1.92***   1.33*   1.75***   1.31* 
Constant   6.74  -0.72   2.35   1.38   3.39  -0.65   7.39 
Observations    63    63  63    63    63    63    63 
Adjusted R
2   0.38   0.56   0.56   0.51   0.51   0.55   0.56 
For full definition of the variables, see Table A2 in the Appendix 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
#: Instrumented: GINI and 90/10 ratio; instruments: LAB_MKT_PERF, CENTR_adj, EMPL 15-24, PART_t, SELF_e. 
 
These outcomes are in general confirmed changing the inequality measure (90/10 percentile ratio) 
(table 5 and table A4 in the appendix), with the difference that the levels of significance of the Ineq 
coefficients further decrease in the spatial models and in two cases exceed the 10% level. The same 
general structure of the outcomes and the positive inequality/growth relationship is confirmed in the short 
term (2000-2004) growth regressions estimated with the Hoffmeister database (tables 6 and A5), using a 
third measure (MLD) of inequality. The coefficients are indeed all positive and significant in the 2SLS 
estimates, although their significance level decreases in the ML spatial lag estimates, again exceeding the 
10% level in two cases. In the spatial error models which again have a more limited explanatory capacity, 
although never significant, the sign of MLD is inverted. 
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TABLE 6 
EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY ON REGIONAL GROWTH (2000-2004), HOFFMEISTER - 2000 DATABASE (IV-2SLS
#) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
GDP  (log)  -1.08*** -1.09*** -1.97*** -1.09*** -0.97  -0.81*  -0.96 
MLD  16.96*** 15.83**  19.17*** 15.55**  16.75*** 14.78** 22.93*** 
HC  -  -0.16 -0.24 0.09    0.43   0.41  -1.83 
ER_AGRI  - - -0.09*  - - -  -0.12** 
ER_IND  - - - 0.02  - -  - 
ER_SERV - - - - -0.00  -  -0.07 
R_D  - - - - - -0.26  -0.14 
D_Hungary   2.18***   2.17***   1.70**   2.10***   2.19***   2.12***   1.66** 
D_Italy  -3.16*** -3.10*** -3.20*** -3.13*** -3.12*** -3.22***  -3.54*** 
D_Slovenia   2.18**   2.13**   2.34**   1.98*   2.12*   2.12**   2.08* 
D_Luxembourg   3.13***   3.10***   3.72***   3.11***   3.09**   2.95**   3.48*** 
Constant  11.84*** 11.93*** 20.69*** 11.72*** 10.72    9.47**   12.18 
Observations    58    58    58    58    58    58    58 
Adjusted R
2   0.53   0.53   0.51   0.53   0.51   0.55   0.46 
For full definition of the variables, see Table A2 in the Appendix 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
#: Instrumented: MLD (1995); instruments: LAB_MKT_PERF, CENTR_adj, EMPL 15-24, PART_t, SELF_e. 
 
  In summary, the data show a prevailing positive relationship between the initial level of income 
inequality and subsequent short- and medium-term economic growth. This outcome is common to 
different inequality measures but the significance and the strength of the relationship decreases for the 
spatial econometric models. In interpreting this result, as already emphasised, we must take into account 
that, due to the limitations of the data available, it was not possible to test the stability of this result by 
using panel data econometric approaches - proposed by recent literature as crucial in order to investigate 
the relationship properly. Therefore, further research efforts are required to test the robustness of the 
outcome obtained which is, however, a starting point in the analysis of the relationship at sub-national 
level. 
Given this present state of the knowledge in this specific field, we may try to understand if the 
outcome of a positive link between inequality and growth at regional level may be explained in the light of 
the theoretical arguments proposed in sections 2.2. and 2.3. In this attempt, we must bear in mind 
particularly that the positive relationship emerges from an empirical analysis which: (i) covers medium- 
and short-term periods; (ii) refers to sub-national level; and (iii) concerns developed economies. First of 
all, these factors may contribute to weakening the principal channel through which inequality should 
negatively affect growth - the double political economy stage mechanism envisaged first of all by Persson 
and Tabellini (1994). This is indeed clearly a long-term process since, in the short and medium terms, tax 
and transfer systems may be considered as given, so that its effects are at least reduced. More in general, 
all the effects induced by inequality - e.g., on investment decisions - typically explicate their effects in the 
long term (see, e.g., Forbes, 2000; Partridge, 1997). Secondly, when the effects of inequality are studied at 
sub-national level, this “political economy” effect may be greatly weakened (Panizza, 2002, p.28; 
Partridge, 1997, p.1021), since most redistributive and tax policies are decided and implemented at 
national level, partly as an effect of their inefficiency in the presence of high factor mobility. As already 
discussed, the possibility of interregional mobility of capital and labour may weaken the ability of central 
and peripheral governmental bodies to undertake effective redistributive actions, since labour and capital 
have the opportunity to escape (or not settle in) contexts with more severe redistributive targets (Partridge, 
1997; Panizza, 2002). As a result, growth rates will be low in the original region and high in the 
destination region, where incentives signalled by inequality are better (Partridge, 2006). In addition, 
regions with lower inequality may attract worse-off households in search of social protection, migrating 
from more unequal regional systems. As a consequence, average incomes may decrease in the former and 
increase in the latter, supporting a positive inequality-growth relationship (Partridge, 1997, p.1030).  
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  The fact that our analysis refers to developed countries also provides support for the evidence of a 
positive inequality-growth relationship (Brandolini and Rossi, 1997). For example, the growth-curbing 
“credit constraints” channel (Barro, 2000 p.18) may be an important factor only in developing or poorer 
countries, but not so influential in developed contexts, where financial markets are usually available and 
functioning. Conversely, a positive link in developed countries may also be related to the above discussed 
SBTC effect, which generates labour market adjustments towards skill-intensive labour, a primary source 
of growth which, at least during the adjustment, may promote inequality (Partridge, 1997, pp.1020 and 
1030). However, in this case, disentangling the direction of causality is quite complex. 
  Thus, de-activation of major growth-inhibiting factors may tip the balance in favour of growth-
promoting factors, particularly the role of observed inequality as an incentive towards undertaking 
investments (in human and physical capital) or encouraging work efforts (Partridge, 1997, p. 1030). If 
economic agents consider the fiscal and social benefits system as given in the short term, and therefore 
disregard the political economy effects of nation-level inequality, the significant inequality level from 
which they draw information for micro-economic incentives is the regional one. This does supply closer 
and more visible evidence of potential investment/effort revenues obtained by agents operating in the 
same economic, social and institutional contexts, providing more contiguous examples of successful 
economic patterns. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND FINAL REMARKS 
  In this paper we provided an analysis on the determinants of regional income inequality in Europe 
and its effects on growth. We first reviewed the broad existing literature on these fields, and then 
considered the specific features, in particular those related to factor mobility, emerging when analysis is 
carried out at sub-national levels. Our empirical analysis was carried out using two datasets of regional 
inequality for several European countries (Mahler, 2002; Hoffmeister, 2006a), derived from available data 
of the Luxembourg Income Study. Our descriptive analysis shows not only remarkable diversification of 
regional income inequality not only across Europe, but also within single countries. In addition, the spatial 
descriptive tools employed supply evidence of spatial patterns of inequality across the regions considered, 
which are not totally captured by national boundaries and thus institutional and structural diversities. 
The econometric estimates on the determinants of regional inequality supply variegated outcomes. 
This is partly due to the difference in space and time coverage for the two datasets and to the availability 
of data on possible explanatory variables. In any case, although a univocal picture does not emerge, the 
results clearly highlight the crucial importance of: (i) national level factors, in particular related to 
institutional settings of the labour market and welfare state, and (ii) quantitative and qualitative regional 
labour market features. These results are of major political concern for Europe, in view of the considerable 
variability of performance and dynamic patterns of regional labour markets, and the ongoing debate about 
labour market and welfare state reforms in many member countries. 
  Our second empirical analysis was focused on the impact of inequality on regional growth. In 
general the results suggest that more regional inequality may promote higher regional growth in the short 
and medium term, although the significance and strength of the relationship decreases for the econometric 
models which take into account the spatial structure of the data. In interpreting these results we must bear 
in mind that our analysis is cross-sectional, and the recent literature on the topic has clearly stressed that 
the use of panel data approaches may produce opposed results. Therefore, further research efforts should 
be devoted to test the stability of the results obtained here, which would suggest the prevalence of growth-
promoting over growth-inhibiting forces activated by inequality. If these findings were confirmed, they 
may be explained theoretically in the light of the three distinctive factors of our analysis (short- and 
medium-term, regional level, developed regions), which all may contribute towards weakening the main 
channels that justify a negative relationship. De-activation of the major growth-inhibiting factors, due to 
the short period considered and to the consideration of developed context, and the various effects 
produced by higher factor mobility may indeed tip the balance in favour of growth-promoting factors, 
particularly the role of observed inequality as an incentive to undertaking investments (in human and 
physical capital) or to encourage work efforts. From this point of view, we also stress the importance of 
the (closer) regional level of observed inequality in supplying important information on which economic 
incentives and consequent behaviour may be shaped. 
If the existence of a positive inequality/growth link were confirmed in future researches, this 
would not mean that policy-makers interested in growth should necessarily promote inequality since, as 
emphasised by Forbes (2000) and supported by our interpretation, this positive relationship in the short  
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term is not incompatible with a negative one in the long term. Similarly, a national-scale negative 
relationship may coexist with the regional positive one, at least partly due to higher factor mobility (Fallah 
and Partridge, 2006). 
Our results, although they must be interpreted with caution, represent a starting point for further, 
more comprehensive and complex in-depth efforts, able to provide policy-makers with informative data on 
regional dynamics complementary to those already existing at broader or different geographical levels.  
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A1 
REGIONS CONSIDERED IN THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Mahler - 1995 database 
 
 
 
Hoffmeister - 2000 database 
 
All NUTS1 level 
FRANCE (NUTS2)  ITALY (NUTS2)  AUSTRIA  LUXEMBOURG 
Alsace Abruzzo  Ostosterreich   
Aquitaine Basilicata  Westosterreich SPAIN 
Auvergne Calabria  Sudosterreich Canarias  (ES) 
Basse-Normandie Campania    Centro  (ES) 
Bourgogne Emilia  Romagna  BELGIUM  Este 
Brittany  Friuli Venezia Giulia  Flanders  Noroeste 
Centre  Lazio  Wallonia  Com.  de Madrid 
Cham.-Ardennes Liguria  Brussels  Noreste 
Corsica Lombardia    Sur 
Franche-Comté Marche  FINLAND   
Haute-Normandie Molise   SWEDEN 
Ile-de-France Piemonte  GERMANY   
Langeudoc-Roussillon Abulia  Hamburg  UNITED KINGDOM 
Limousin Sardegna  Berlin  London 
Lorraine Sicilia  Hessen  South-East 
Midi-Pyrénées Trentino-Alto  Adige  Bayern  Eastern 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais Toscana  Bremen  North-West 
Pays-de-la-Loire Umbria  Schleswig-Holstein West  Midlands 
Picardie Veneto  Niedersachsen  South  West 
Poitou-Charentes    Nordrhein-Westfalen Yorkshire- 
Provence-Alpes-Cote    Rheinl.-Pfalz-Saarland Scotland 
Rhone-Alpes    Baden-Wuttemberg East  Midlands 
    Meckl.-Vorpommern Wales 
GERMANY (NUTS1)*  UNITED KINGDOM (NUTS1)  Brandenburg North-East 
Baden-Wurttemberg East  Anglia Sachsen-Anhalt   
Bavaria East  Midlands  Sachsen  ESTONIA 
Brandenburg-W.Pom. Greater  London  Thuingen   
Bremen North    HUNGARY 
Hamburg Northern  Ireland  GREECE  Kozep-Magyarorszag 
Hesse North-west  Kentriki-Ellada Dunantul 
Lower Saxony  Scotland  Voreia-Ellada  Alfold-es-Eszak 
Mecklenburg South-east    Nisia-Aigaiou.-Kriti   
N.Rhine-Westphalia South-west  Attiki-(incl.  Gr.Athens)  POLAND 
Rhineland-Palatinate Wales    Centralny 
Saxony West  Midlands  IRELAND  Polnocno-Zachodni 
Saxony-Anhalt Yorkshire  Humberside    Polnocny 
Schleswig-Holstein    ITALY Poludniowo-Zachodni 
Thuringia    Isole Wschodni 
    Sud (IT)  Poludniowy 
    Nord Ovest   
    Nord Est  SLOVENIA 
    Centro (IT)   
* In Mahler database, East and West Berlin are considered separately, and were excluded from the analysis.  
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TABLE A2 
LIST AND ABBREVIATIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
Variable Definition  Source 
Group in 
equations 
1, 4, 5* 
GDP  GDP per inhabitant in PPP  Eurostat regio   
DENS  Population density  Eurostat regio   
ER_agri 
Employment in agriculture and fisheries (A_B) / population aged 
15-64  Eurostat regio   
ER_industry  Employment in industry (C_F) / population aged 15-64  Eurostat regio   
ER_mkt_serv 
Employment in marketable services (G_K)/ population aged 15-
64  Eurostat regio   
ER_other_serv  Employment in other services (L_P)/ population aged 15-64  Eurostat regio   
DEV 
Level of economic development (first factor of PCA using GDP, 
DENS, ER_mkt_serv, ER_agri)     
ER  Employment / population aged 15-64  Eurostat regio   
FER  Female employment / female population aged 15-64  Eurostat regio   
UR  Unemployed / labour force  Eurostat regio   
LONG_ur  Unemployed > 12 months / labour force  Eurostat regio  ECON 
SELF_e  Self-employment / total employment  Eurostat regio   
PART_t  Part-time employment / total employment Eurostat  regio   
LAB_MKT_PERF 
Labour market performance (first factor of PCA using ER, FER, 
UR, LONG_ur) 
   
EMPL (age) 
Employment in age classes (15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64, 
over 65)/ total employment  Eurostat regio   
R_D 
Total (business enterprise sector) intramural R&D expenditure as 
% of GDP  Eurostat regio   
INN  Patent applications to EPO per million inhabitants  Eurostat regio   
HC 
Population with at least upper secondary education - levels 3-6 
(ISCED 1997) / population aged 15 years and over  Eurostat regio   
HC1 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education - 
levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997) / population aged 15 years and over   Eurostat regio   
HC2 
Tertiary education - levels 5-6 (ISCED 1997) / population aged 
15 years and over  Eurostat regio   
POP > 65  Share of population aged 65 years and more  Eurostat regio  DEMO
UNION_adj
# 
Union density (% of unionised workers on total) * share of 
dependent employment 
OECD Employment 
Outlook 2004 and Eurostat   
CENTR_adj
§ 
Indicator of bargaining centralisation (range 1-5) * share of 
dependent employment 
OECD Employment 
Outlook 2004 and Eurostat 
 
INST 
COORD_adj
§ 
Indicator of bargaining coordination (range 1-5) * share of 
dependent employment 
OECD Employment 
Outlook 2004 and Eurostat  
 
WELF  Expenditure in social protection benefits as a % of GDP  Eurostat   
* ECON: economic/structural variables; DEMO: demographic variables; INST:  institutional variables. 
# Only available for 1990 and 2000, so average values were used for Mahler - 1995 database. Not available for 
Estonia and Slovenia, to which average for other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries was attributed. 
§ Not available for Estonia, Slovenia, Luxembourg and Greece. Average values of the corresponding groups (CEE 
and EU-15, respectively) were assigned to these countries.  
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TABLE A3 
EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI) ON REGIONAL % GROWTH 1995-2004, MAHLER -1995 DATABASE (ML 
SPATIAL LAG) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP  (log)  -0.40 -0.43 -0.62*  -0.30 -0.61 -0.42 -0.82* 
GINI   3.01*   3.64**   3.79**   2.17   3.66**   3.64**   3.81** 
HC  -   5.82***   5.53***   5.40***   4.98**   5.83***   4.56** 
ER_AGRI - - -0.05  - - - -0.06 
ER_IND  - - - -0.02*  - - - 
ER_SERV  - - - -   0.01*  -   0.02* 
R_D  - - - - -   0.00  -0.00 
D_Italy  -0.98***   1.01*   1.01*   0.89*   0.86   1.00*   0.84 
D_France  -0.35**   1.15***   1.16***   1.00**   1.00**   1.15***   0.99** 
Constant   5.30*   1.62   3.64   1.26   3.42   1.52   5.76 
ρ   0.50***   0.34***   0.35***   0.39***   0.32**   0.34***   0.32** 
Observations     63     63     63     63     63     63     63 
Sq. cor. (pseudo R
2)   0.73   0.77   0.77   0.78   0.77   0.77   0.77 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
 
TABLE A4 
EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY (90/10 RATIO) ON % REGIONAL GROWTH (1995-2004), MAHLER -1995 DATABASE 
(ML SPATIAL LAG) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP  (log)  -0.30 -0.29  -0.46  -0.19 -0.49*  -0.28 -0.71* 
90/10 ratio   0.28*   0.11   0.24*   0.02   0.29*   0.21*   0.22* 
HC  -   5.74***   5.46***   5.14***   4.80**   5.75***   4.38** 
ER_AGRI  - -  -0.05  - - - -0.05 
ER_IND  - -  -  -0.03**  - - - 
ER_SERV  - -  -  -   0.01  -   0.02 
R_D  - -  -  - -   -0.00  0.01 
D_Italy  -0.84***   1.13**   1.13**   0.93*   0.97   1.13**   0.95 
D_France  -0.31*   1.18***   1.19***   0.94**   1.01**   1.18***   1.00** 
Constant   4.56   0.57   2.48   0.83   2.58   0.53   4.94 
ρ   0.56***   0.41***   0.42***   0.46***   0.39***   0.41***   0.39*** 
Observations     63     63     63     63     63     63     63 
Sq. cor. (pseudo R
2)   0.73   0.77   0.77   0.78   0.77   0.77   0.77 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
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TABLE A5 
EFFECTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY ON % REGIONAL GROWTH (2000-2004), HOFFMEISTER - 2000 DATABASE (ML 
SPATIAL LAG) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP  (log)  -0.66** -0.65** -1.27***  -0.64** -1.25*  -0.36  -1.32** 
MLD   4.52*   4.50*   5.23**   3.83*   3.01   3.77*   2.82 
HC  -  -0.03 -0.45 -0.00 -1.06   0.26 -0.97 
ER_AGRI  - - -0.06*  - - - -0.04 
ER_IND  - - - -0.02  - - - 
ER_SERV  - - - -   0.03  -   0.03 
R_D  - - - - - -0.29*  -0.33** 
D_Hungary   1.44***   1.44***   1.10*   1.48***   1.37**   1.41***   1.09* 
D_Italy  -2.13*** -2.14*** -2.25*** -2.09*** -2.08*** -2.30*** -2.35*** 
D_Slovenia   2.20***   2.20***   2.27***   2.32***   2.34***   2.19***   2.37*** 
D_Luxembourg   2.39***   2.38***   2.72***   2.31***   2.57***   2.24***   2.65*** 
Constant   8.17**   8.17**  14.67**   8.33**   13.58**   5.50   14.98** 
ρ   0.37***   0.37***   0.36***   0.38***   0.36***   0.36***   0.34*** 
Observations     58     58     58     58     58     58     58 
Sq. cor. (pseudo R
2)   0.69   0.69   0.70   0.69   0.69   0.70   0.72 
*** = significant at 1%;** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10% 
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